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FOREWORD 
LAW AND ECONOMICS:                             
THE LEGACY OF GUIDO CALABRESI 
ALAIN MARCIANO* 
GIOVANNI B. RAMELLO** 
There is no doubt that what is generally known as law and economics is now 
a well-established scientific approach, settled in our intellectual landscape. Its 
importance is today not only theoretical but also—and quite importantly—
practical. The law-and-economics perspective is so relevant in dealing with 
problems arising from everyday-life interactions of human beings embedded in 
a given legal setting that it now qualifies as a sort of programmatic approach for 
law practitioners and scholars. Indeed, the use of economics—economic 
reasoning and economic modeling—as a tool to tackle otherwise difficult and 
complex legal problems is now frequent, to say the least. Moreover, an 
increasing number of judges and legal scholars have taken economics courses 
and are influenced by the material, certainly in the United States and now more 
than ever in Europe. Economics did not always have such a role in law. 
This change is the result of a movement that began before World War II, 
gained structure in the 1950s, took further shape in the 1960s, and established 
itself in the 1970s, essentially under the influence of economists and legal 
 
Copyright © 2014 by Alain Marciano & Giovanni B. Ramello. 
 This article is also available at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/. 
 *  Teacher–Researcher, Department of Economics, University of Montpellier 1, France; 
Member, Montpellier Laboratory for Theoretical and Applied Economics, France. 
 **  Associate Professor of Industrial Economics, University of Eastern Piedmont – Alessandria, 
Italy. We thank the many colleagues and institutions that supported this project and made its 
accomplishment possible. In particular, we are grateful to the authors who generously contributed to 
this issue of Law and Contemporary Problems, and to the CEVRO Institute in Prague for hosting a 
workshop for presenting and discussing preliminary drafts. We are also indebted to the workshop’s 
anonymous referees who reviewed the articles and provided insights to the authors. We owe the 
greatest thanks to the editorial staff and faculty board of Law and Contemporary Problems, who  
enthusiastically endorsed this project and made it possible to pursue. Thanks especially to Stuart M. 
Benjamin, a past Chairman of the faculty board, and Lauren Haertlein, Editor in Chief of Law and 
Contemporary Problems Volume 75, who together oversaw this issue’s acceptance, and to Alfred 
Jensen and Larissa Boz, the Editor in Chief and Managing Editor of Volume 77, respectively, who 
managed publication. Thanks also to all of the editors of Volume 77, for their tireless work preparing 
the issue for publication. A very warm thanks, finally, to Guido, for his long-lasting scholarly 
contribution, spanning more than five decades—a contributuion that has had a fundamental influence 
on many of this issue’s authors—and also for having excitedly endorsed this project with juvenile fervor 
(even despite the years) this project. 
0_FOREWORD_EIC (DO NOT DELETE) 7/6/2014  1:33 PM 
ii LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 77:i 
 
scholars from the so-called Chicago school, particularly. Ronald Coase1 and 
Richard Posner2 (an economist and a legal scholar, respectively). They and 
others helped to create a field of studies at the intersection of economics and 
the law. Henry Manne played also a crucial role in the movement, although he 
is not a Chicagoan.3 
The other non-Chicagoan founding father of the law-and-economics 
discipline is Guido Calabresi.4 Indeed, one cannot—and probably nobody 
would—consider the current intense interplay between law and economics 
without recognizing the role played by the “outsider” Guido Calabresi, whose 
work “enabled Yale to carve out its own niche in the field,” after “the ‘boom’ 
period of law and economics, the late 1960s and early 1970s, [when] Chicago 
dominated.”5 Calabresi really initiated an original approach: of course different 
from what most legal scholars did, but also from what economists—Coase, for 
instance, or Aaron Director—started to do.6 With his unique approach, 
Calabresi somehow simultaneously anticipated and set himself apart from what 
Posner did in the early 1970s at Chicago. To put it differently, Calabresi helped 
popularize the use of economics to study and analyze legal problems, but did so 
in his own specific way.7 
Calabresi’s publishing career started with the remarkable article Some 
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ISSUE) 1. 
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 4.  To be more precise, in 1991, the American Law and Economics Association granted the title of 
“founding fathers” of the law and economics movement to Calabresi, Coase, Manne, and Posner. AM. 
L. & ECON. ASS’N, http://www.amlecon.org/ (last visited June 25, 2014). 
 5.  LAURA KALMAN, YALE LAW SCHOOL AND THE SIXTIES: REVOLT AND REVERBERATIONS 
243 (2005). 
 6.  See generally Alain Marciano & Giovanni B. Ramello, Consent, Choice, and Guido Calabresi’s 
Heterodox Economic Analysis of Law, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., No. 2, 2014 at 97; Steven G. 
Medema, Juris Prudence: Calabresi’s Uneasy Relationship with the Coase Theorem, 77 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., No. 2, 2014 at 65. 
 7.  See generally Marciano & Ramello, supra note 6; Medema, supra note 6. 
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Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts (Some Thoughts)8—written 
in the 50s when Calabresi was still a student, and published in 1961—in which 
he provided many seeds that in the subsequent five decades have germinated, 
transforming a fragile bud of an idea into a mature and robust discipline. This 
probably explains why, more than fifty years later, the article is still worth 
reading—for its legal dimension, for how it mixes a legal and an economic 
reasoning, and also for broader, let us say, ethical and philosophical reasons. 
Yet Some Thoughts is remarkable not just because it is foundational for law and 
economics, but also because it is foundational for Calabresi. Indeed, a lot of 
Calabresi’s ideas about law, economics, justice, liability, and so forth, can be 
traced back to this original work. But, returning to the the article’s greater 
influence, Some Thoughts had a huge impact on lawyers and economists, both 
inside the United States and outside it—especially in Europe. All this influence 
is the subject of this issue of Law and Contemporary Problems: The authors in 
this issue trace the impact and the legacy of Calabresi’s 1961 article and, more 
broadly, of Calabresi himself, of his specific way of applying economics to legal 
problem solving. The goal of the authors in this issue is to analyze the origins 
and influence of Calabresi’s works, their ideological, technical, and 
methodological aspects, as well as the connections, similarities, and differences 
between Calabresis’s works and the other major works in law and economics or 
economic analyses of the law. Put more simply, the authors in this issue 
evaluate Calabresi’s legacy in the academia. Scholars from different fields using 
different methodologies propose a multifaceted view of Calabresi’s 
contributions to legal studies and to law and economics. 
This issue of Law and Contemporary Problems starts with Guido Calabresi’s 
own article, entitled A Broader View of the Cathedral: The Significance of the 
Liability Rule, Correcting a Misapprehension—a significant title indeed, 
revealing how important and even necessary it still remains for Calabresi, after 
more than fifty years of work and writings, to clarify his views.9 This is not to say 
that Calabresi’s views were not clear; rather, as is the case with all important 
scholars (especially judges), there is always room for interpretation. Calabresi’s 
clarification begins with the premise that torts scholars who view the area as 
one of private law (for example, those who assert that torts is only about just 
compensation, or that it is only about redressing private wrongs) miss the public 
function of the field, a function that would remain there even if the private link 
between injurers and victims were eliminated.10 After showing this 
misapprehension for what it is, Calabresi then demonstrates the public function 
of torts: The liability rule (in both torts and in takings and eminent-domain 
law), is not used principally, much less solely, to approach the result that would 
occur in a free market of consensual exchanges (were such a market available), 
but is instead used approach inalienability (that is, a fully collective result) in 
 
 8.  70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961). 
 9.  77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2014 at 1. 
 10.  Id. at 2–3. 
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those instances when a criminal-law solution is not desired.11 Calabresi expands 
on this argument by showing that the liability rule (of the collectively set price) 
is used to achieve goals that are neither purely libertarian nor purely 
collectivist, but are properly viewed as social democratic.12 With this last 
argument, Calabresi sets the tone of this issue of Law and Contemporary 
Problems and also provides evidence useful in resolving one of its central topics: 
namely, where he stands between the “left” and the “right,” between critical 
legal studies and Chicago neoclassical law and economics. 
Part of the answer lies in Calabresi’s personal history. In effect, even if 
technical and methodological analyses are necessary to make sense of his ideas, 
they do not suffice. Laura Kalman, in her contribution to this issue of Law and 
Contemporary Problems, provides just such a personal history, in the form of 
what may very well be the first intellectual biography of Calabresi.13 Many of 
the details and insights provided by Kalman cannot be found in previously 
published articles and books, and yet they are critical to explaining the 
foundations of his Calabresi’s research. Kalman structures her article by using 
historical detail to link Calabresi’s life and career to important influencing 
elements, paramount among them, Yale.14 Yale in the 1950s and 1960s, after 
Calabresi’s family had left Italy, fleeing fascism, such that Calabresi was in a 
sense a refugee and an outsider.15 Yale also in the sense of a place different than 
Chicago.16 In effect, in 1960, Edward Levi offered Calabresi a tenured position 
at Chicago.17 Calabresi was only twenty-eight years old. He had not even 
published his first article. Yet he turned Levi’s offer down.18 He wanted to stay 
at Yale, where he had his American roots and where he would eventually spend 
his entire career.19 Although it is hard to tell how and to what extent all this 
influenced Calabresi, it is equally impossible to ignore these events. For these 
reasons, Kalman’s article provides a perspective critical for understanding the 
scholarship of Calabresi. 
James Hackney’s contribution provides a complement to this historical 
perspective by locating Calabresi’s contribution in the American legal 
scholarship.20 And, besides situating Calabresi’s, Hackney’s historical sketches 
 
 11.  Id. at 8–9. 
 12.  Id. at 9. 
 13.  Laura Kalman, Some Thoughts on Yale and Guido, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2014 
at 15. 
 14.  Id. at 15. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  See id. at 40–41. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  See id. 
 20.  James R. Hackney, Jr., Guido Calabresi and the Construction of Contemporary American 
Legal Theory, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2014 at 45. 
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also depict the broader intellectual milieu in which Calabresi wrote.21 Hackney 
tries to determine where Calabresi stood and how he navigated between critical 
legal studies, liberal-rights theory and law and economics.22 In the course of his 
analysis, Hackney shows that Calabresi was subject to criticisms from the left—
where critical legal theorists criticized “the law-and-economics enterprise as an 
attempt to mask politics in the form of science”23—and also from neoclassical 
economists like Posner, with whom Calabresi reciprocally disagreed.24 Hackney 
shows how Calabresi answered these criticisms and, following a “long and 
winding” path, built his own legal theory.25 One important element of 
Calabresi’s contribution to law and economics emphasized by Hackney is 
Calabresi’s “creative use of economic analysis with realist insights.”26 This 
probably explains why, in the 1960s, Calabresi was pioneering something akin 
to what we could today define a behavioral approach in law and economics. At 
least, this is one of Hackney’s conclusions.27 
Steven Medema’s article also deals with the differences between Calabresi, 
Coase, and Posner, and each’s respective views on law and economics.28 
Medema analyzes a very interesting matter, namely the past and future 
perception of Calabresi as one of the inventor of the Coase theorem.29 Professor 
Kalman’s article provides some evidence of this perception,30 and Medema 
explores the view through a methodical reading of Calabresi’s writings in light 
of the similarities and the differences that exist between Calabresi’s ideas and 
the Coase theorem, all the while taking care to conduct his analysis at a 
historical level, without an ideological dimension. Medema illustrates that 
Calabresi’s understanding of the Coase theorem evolved over time: that 
Calabresi “increasingly converged toward Coase’s larger message in The 
Problem of Social Cost and away from the silliness that makes up so much of 
the commentary, pro and con, on the Coase theorem.”31 Medema further 
specifies what, exactly, Coase’s larger message was, and concludes that 
Calabresi is close to Coase—at least to the “real” one who can be found in the 
original versions of his works rather than to the narrow and standard version of 
Coase that can be found, for instance, in Stigler’s account of the Coase 
theorem.32 Medema’s view of the two Coase’s echoes what Calabresi said in 
 
 21.  Id. at 47–52.  
 22.  Id. at 54–62. 
 23.  Id. at 53. 
 24.  Id. at 53–54. 
 25.  Id. at 62. 
 26.  Id. at 63. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Medema, supra note 6, at 65. 
 29.  Kalman, supra note 13, at 33–36. 
 30.  Medema, supra note 28, at 94. 
 31.  Id. at 92–95. 
 32.  GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 113 (3d ed. 1966). 
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199133 when he identified the “young socialist” of The Nature of the Firm34 and 
the “middle-aged libertarian” of The Problem of Social Cost.35 Pushing 
Medema’s conclusion about which Coase Calabresi agrees with a bit further, 
one may say that it also illustrates the distance that separates Calabresi from the 
standard, neoclassical approach in economics. This is somewhat different from 
Hackney’s thesis, but similar to what Alain Marciano and Giovanni Ramello, 
and then Enrico Colombatto, argue. 
In their article, Marciano and Ramello follow this implication of Medema’s 
conclusion by insisting on the differences between a neoclassical approach to 
law and economics on the one hand and Calabresi’s view on the other.36 Their 
analysis starts with reminding the reader that mainstream neoclassical 
economics is limited to analyzing choices made under given conditions.37 
Consent (to those conditions) is not discussed.38 Put another way, the 
straightforward—although not always explicit—assumption is that choosing 
evidences consent, because dissent would translate into the absence of choice.39 
Posner’s economic analysis of law and Coase’s law and economics both rely 
upon this notion. But this is not the case for Calabresi, who takes a different 
view: Consent occupies an important place in Calabresi’s reasoning as early as 
Some Thoughts, when, for the first time, besides showing the utility of the 
resource-allocation criterion, he emphasizes the importance of considering 
“starting points” and distributive principles.40 In Calabresi’s view, the law-and-
economics scholar cannot remain neutral about the distribution of resources. 
Colombatto disagrees, stressing in his article that questions about 
distribution and justice—upon which Calabresi insists—pertain “to political 
philosophy, rather than to economics.”41 According to Colombatto, Calabresi’s 
inistence on distributive considerations, besides differentiating Calabresi from  
neoclassical scholars, also differentiates him from free-market advocates—but 
in only one, albeit significant, way. Under Calabresi’s approach, the implication 
is that  liability may exist even if there is no injurer.42 But, according to 
Colombatto, that is the only difference between Calabresi and free-market 
advocates.43 This is a novel viewpoint worth of attention: By departing from the 
 
 33.  Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211, 
1211 (1991). 
 34.  R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
 35.  Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 1. 
 36.  Marciano & Ramello, supra note 6. 
 37.  Id. at 101–02. 
 38.  Id. at 102. 
 39.  Id. at 97. 
 40.  Id. at 105.  
 41.  Enrico Colombatto, A Free-Market View on Accidents and Torts, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., no. 2, 2014 at 117, 132. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. 
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neoclassical vision of the Chicagoans, which is incompatible with free-market 
tenets, Calabresi “sides with the free-market perspective.”44 Therefore, 
Calabresi’s “way of framing the law-and-economics debate is more fruitful,” 
from Colombatto’s libertarian, free-market perspective, “than the standard 
neoclassical version.”45 A free-market supporter, argues Colombatto, has much 
to learn from Calabresi’s rejection of the neoclassical concepts of efficiency, 
wealth creation, and reciprocity—all of which are objectionable from a free-
market perspective because they can be used to advocate violations of freedom 
of contract—and also from his analyses of uncertainty, which counsels against 
regulations and judicial intervention.46 More broadly, Colombatto’s discussion 
implies that the nature of liability and the right to be compensated are not only 
technical matters—determined by objective and neutral notions such as wealth 
or efficiency or uncertainty or costs—but rest on fundamental, superior, not to 
say ideological, principles. 
Those principles were present in Calabresi’s mind when he wrote Some 
Thoughts. His views about liability and compensation were not guided by 
efficiency only. This might be why he paid so much attention to insurance and 
also why, as Joni Hersch and W. Kip Viscusi write in their article, he established 
the “insurance objective of tort liability,”47 recasting “tort liability as providing 
an implicit form of insurance.”48 That this was an important move is evidenced 
by the fact that “[t]his framework remains the linchpin of economic theories of 
tort liability as a compensation mechanism.”49 Hersch and Viscusi then proceed 
by analyzing “[h]ow and when tort liability does in fact serve [Calabresi’s 
claimed] insurance function.”50 They conclude that there are circumstances, 
situations in which the “insurance objective” of tort liability cannot be 
fulfilled—because some losses cannot be “fully insured.”51 For example, on 
limitation on insurable losses is that “[i]nsurance is only viable if losses can be 
anticipated and priced accordingly.”52 In those cases, other forms of regulation 
should be used to complement tort liability.  Indeed, Hersch and Viscusi 
conclude that “the insurance function of tort liability has limits” and that “tort 
liability has a limited constructive role to play,” and add that “there are other 
social institutions, such as government regulation, that can serve a constructive 
function by working in tandem with tort liability.”53 Despite Hersch and 
Viscusi’s conclusion that tort liability’s insurance objective is unfulfillable, they 
 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 133. 
 46.  Id. at 131–33. 
 47.  Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Assessing the Insurance Role of Tort Liability after Calabresi, 77 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2014 at 135, 135. 
 48.  Id. at 162. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. at 136.  
 51.  Id. at 162–63.  
 52.  Id. 
 53.   Id. at 163. 
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nonetheless assert that “tort liability retains a valuable risk-spreading function 
in many situations and may be superior to alternative institutional mechanisms 
in fostering incentives” 
Mark Geistfeld’s article, the last in this issue of Law and Contemporary 
Problems, complements Hersch and Viscusi’s.54 In effect, Geistfeld concludes 
the issue by noting that a compensatory tort rule—a tort rule based on the the 
Pareto principle—cannot be reduced to a form of accident insurance.55 Thus, 
Geistfeld interprets tort law in the compensatory terms of the autonomy-based 
Pareto principle—he replaces a welfarist approach to tort law, aimed at 
minimizing the social costs of accidents, with a nonwelfarist approach based on 
individual autonomy and equal freedom.56 To Geistfeld, the Pareto principle is 
appealing because it embodies a form of compensation that can be used to 
define a compensatory tort rule “that limits (nonconsensual) compensatory 
exchanges to forms of risky behavior that do not disvalue the autonomy of 
those threatened by the behavior.”57 Geistfeld then shows that such a rule 
distributes risk in a way “that those who benefit from new instances of risk 
behavior satisfy the reasonable compensatory demands of those who would 
otherwise be disadvantaged.”58 Thus, a compensatory tort rule does not simply 
improve the allocation of resources but also contributes to shifting the Pareto 
frontier outwards.59 In other words, a compensatory tort rule creates more 
wealth for society. 
 
 
 54.  Mark A. Geistfeld, Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts: Carrying Calabresi Further, 77 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2014 at 165. 
 55.  Id. at 168. 
 56.  Id. at 171–74. 
 57.  Id. at 172. 
 58.  Id. at 188. 
 59.  Id. 
